Concerning religious faith, the will has a role because faith is not simply a propositional belief, but first of all an act of trust. Attention is also given to self-deception and wishful thinking. Both the relationship between belief and the act of assent and the structure of epistemic doubt, as well as the difference between holding-truth and holding-as- truth (and between believing, assuming or presuming) are elucidated. William Alston's position on this issue is developed and enriched: types of indirect voluntary control beliefs are allowed, while the assertion that there is also a direct control is shown to be empirically unjustified. The first part of the work lays out conceptual and theoretical distinctions useful to develop anti-voluntarist accounts of the phenomena usually put forward in defence of doxastic voluntarism. In general, it criticizes the voluntarist account, namely the claim that you can decide what to believe. This inquiry aims at exploring the complex human relationship to truth, and in particular its normative aspects, on the basis of the relation between belief and the will.
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